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It has been argued that a country such as Liberia, not fully recovered from the devastation of decades of
civil unrest, lacked the appropriate ethical and regulatory framework, basic human and health care
services, and infrastructure to carry out clinical trials according to international standards of quality
during a public health emergency. However, as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea were being ravaged by
the largest and most devastating Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak ever recorded, the topic of con-
ducting clinical trials of experimental vaccine and treatment candidates in these resource-poor countries
generated the keen interest and concern of scientists, researchers, physicians, bioethicists, philanthro-
pists, and even politicians. Decisive action on behalf of the Liberian government, and a timely positive
and supportive response from the United States (U.S.) government, led to the formation of PREVAIL
(Partnership for Research on Ebola Vaccines in Liberia) e a clinical research partnership between the two
governments. Within a span of 12 weeks, this partnership accomplished the unimaginable: the suc-
cessful initiation of a Phase II/III vaccine clinical trial for EVD in Liberia. This paper will discuss the dy-
namics of the research collaboration, barriers encountered, breakthroughs realized, key elements of
success, and lessons learned in the process.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Background/aims
Prior to the recent West African EVD epidemic, Liberia’s emer-
gence from decades of civil unrest, which included two successive
civil wars, resulted in a ranking among the world’s least developed
countries. Its fragile healthcare system lacked adequate infra-
structure, human capacity, and access to safe therapies, medical
equipment and limited provision of healthcare services [1,2]. By
August 2014, Liberia had become the most affected country in the
outbreak, reporting more than 200 cases a week for 3 consecutive
weeks. At that time, the fatality rate was reported as 53%. President
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf declared a state of emergency in Liberia onDoe-Anderson).
n open access article under the CCAugust 6 [3], followed a few days later by a declaration by theWorld
Health Organization (WHO) that the outbreak was a public health
emergency of international concern [4]. Healthcare workers were
dying, and many who were not infected with Ebola abandoned
their posts. The country had insufﬁcient Ebola treatment units,
isolation centers, and laboratories to accommodate the rapidly
escalating infection rate and death toll of this new devastating
disease; and unsafe burial practices persisted. Many hospitals were
forced to shut down, while EVD patients and high-risk commu-
nities were isolated and treated with disdain by the Liberian police.
As protestors demonstrated throughout the country in opposition
to the actions e and apparent inactions e of their elected leaders,
conﬁdence in the Liberian government reached an all-time low
[5,6]. In this desperate circumstance, Liberia’s Minister for Health
and Social Welfare, Walter Gwenigale, wrote to Sylvia Burwell, U.S.BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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entities collaborate to conduct research on promising therapeutics
and vaccines for EVD [7].
2. Systematic approach
2.1. Research partnership formed with bilateral support from the
highest levels of government
Minister Gwenigale’s request to form a “partnership” set forth
an organizational structure and process that was both inclusive and
ﬂexible, leveraging a broad range of expertise from both countries
while permitting resolution of conﬂicts and logistical issues with
urgency. He and Secretary Burwell each appointed leaders to
develop the partnership. In addition, the LiberianMinister of Health
and the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia were available to resolve con-
ﬂicts and barriers that required high-level intervention.
Experienced and trusted individuals from each country were
selected to share the leadership of key functional areas (see Fig. 1)
critical to establishing a clinical research program in Liberia that
could initiate and conduct clinical trials according to international
standards of ethics and quality. An organizational governance chart
was established at the onset to mitigate any conﬂicts and to artic-
ulate an authority matrix. In Liberia, the Ebola response effort was
led by an Incident Management System (IMS) consisting of a na-
tional task force and technical expert committee.
The IMS was developed by the Liberian Ministry of Health
(MOH) to oversee the management of the Ebola-related activities
[8]. This group included Liberians with training and experience in
epidemiology, several aspects of clinical research, and highly in-
fectious diseases. The Liberian MOH appointed two individuals - a
physician and medical researcher who is the IMS Coordinator for
EVD research, and a biomedical researcher who heads the Liberian
Institute for Biomedical Research - to represent Liberia in the sci-
entiﬁc leadership of the partnership. Similarly, the Deputy Director
for Clinical Research and Special Projects from the U.S. National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) was selected to
lead the U.S. side of the partnership.
In addition to the medical/scientiﬁc leadership, operationalFig. 1. Organizational structure of the Liberian-US research partnership.ofﬁcers from both the U.S. and Liberia were appointed to provide
oversight and assure integration among the functional teams. The
individuals selected from each of the countries came with decades
of cumulative experience in clinical research and operational
project management. In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Liberia and
relevant government institutions in Liberia (i.e., Ministries of
Health, Justice, Foreign Affairs, and State) promptly and consis-
tently provided invaluable in-country expertise, and logistic and
ﬁnancial support to the partnership as needed.
With the daunting task of establishing an effective framework in
which to accomplish the objectives of the partnership in a
condensed time frame of days to a few weeks, ten functional teams
were established with the responsibilities of developing strategies
based on identiﬁcation of their respective tasks, project timelines,
and relative dependencies. Each team was led by and consisted of
representatives from both countries who worked together to
quickly resolve or escalate barriers as they were identiﬁed.
It was quickly realized that working on this partnership neces-
sitated face-to-face collaboration at most, if not all times. To build
the partnership, establish trust, and work collaboratively to launch
the partnership’s ﬁrst clinical trial, 36 Americans made a total of 68
trips and spent 1032 days in Liberia between October 2, 2014 (when
Secretary Burwell accepted Minister Gwenigale’s request) and
February 2, 2015 (when the ﬁrst participant enrolled in the part-
nership’s ﬁrst clinical trial).
2.2. Social Mobilization and Communication established as a key
functional area
Social mobilization is recognized as a process of engaging a
range of stakeholders to raise awareness within a speciﬁc popula-
tion, obtain their buy-in, and participate in a particular objective
[9]. One of the initial actions of the partnership was to identify
Social Mobilization and Communication (SMC) as a key functional
area needed to establish the clinical research program.
Although none of the clinical research networks previously
developed by the U.S. co-leads had leveraged SMC concepts, it was
clear that implementation of SMC principles and strategies had
proven effective during the ongoing Ebola outbreak and would be
critical to the success of the partnership’s clinical research effort.
In thewake of the outbreak, community leaders took ownership
of the response efforts by establishing community-based Ebola task
forces; these groups of predominantly young people voluntarily
took on the responsibility of providing awareness and sensitization
on the preventive measures of the EVD. They ensured that a robust
contact tracing and case reporting mechanismwas put in place and
that homes that were quarantined received adequate community
support in terms of food, water, and other basic essentials. Realizing
the effectiveness of the community-based SMC strategies, the
Liberian government through the MOH, decided to leverage these
strategies thereby strengthening the capacity of the task force and
other community volunteers who later became ambassadors of
change. Messages were communicated via the print and electronic
media through press releases, talk shows, radio jingles and dramas.
These strategies resulted in adequate information dissemination,
community collaboration, and a more effective response to the
outbreak [10,11].
With the onslaught of information about EVD and the current
outbreak, it was important to communicate information that would
promote dialogue with the community members about their con-
cerns, dispel rumors, and generate trust between the public and the
research partnership [12,13]. The PREVAIL SMC team (consisting of
communicators, mobilizers, scientists, and coordinators) ﬁrst
engaged key national and local stakeholders to garner their support
in making community members aware of the objectives and
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research program. These stakeholders included national politicians,
legislators, and trusted elected or appointed leaders (i.e., county
superintendents, city mayors, governors, commissioners, tradi-
tional, religious, and community leaders).
The SMC team held frequent community engagements and
extensive question and answer sessions with stakeholders at all
levels, including community dwellers and the media, in an effort to
enhance understanding, dispel myths, address concerns, and allay
fears about EVD and clinical research.
The high incidence of EVD infections and deaths in the region
and the government’s delay in providing timely information on the
disease created myths that posed major challenges for the research.
During the social mobilization and community engagement to
inform the communities about the research, the SMC team learned
that community dwellers believed the Ebola virus is man-made,
and the experimental vaccines would be given to infect more
people with the virus to generate more funding to the government.
They also expressed concern that thosewho took the vaccinewould
die during the rainy season because the highest peak of the spread
of the Ebola virus in Liberia occurred during the previous rainy
season. They even shared their beliefs that the Ebola virus outbreak
in Liberia was an instrument of the Liberian government to collect
plasma for commercial purposes, and they believed that the vac-
cine trial was being conducted for the same purpose. The com-
munity dwellers also had misgivings about the word “trial”, which
they believed should be used for animals, and were more
comfortable with the use of the word “study” for humans [14,15].
All of these concerns were factored into the information, education
and communication and behavior change communication mes-
sages that were prepared in simple English and local vernacular to
deliver to all levels of the community through dialogue, written
materials, songs, and dramas enacted by mobile theater.
Because of these consultations with the community leaders and
members, changes were made to the study procedures, such as
expansion of the informed consent process to include a general
information session with pictorial guides and a private session to
address more personal concerns or questions. There was still a
degree of stigma and discrimination associated with participation
in the vaccine trial, as some members of the community believed
that participants were being vaccinated with the Ebola virus and
would eventually infect others in the community. The assignment
of participant trackers ensured consistent contact with the partic-
ipants throughout the study and served as liaisons between the
participants and the research team while maintaining the conﬁ-
dentiality of the participants’ involvement in the study.
As the vaccine trial progressed, and new clinical trials were
initiated, the SMC team was constantly engaging the population to
inform them of new information, as well as to seek critical feedback
from them. This occurred through advocacy meetings with tradi-
tional, religious, political, and community leaders; targeted com-
munity meetings with dwellers of affected communities; press
releases and media brieﬁngs; appearances on radio and television
programs; and communication through songs, dramas, and mobile
theater.
The strategies used by the SMC team to engage the population at
all levels and communicate at the most basic levels resulted in an
establishment of trust in the PREVAIL organization. The SMC team
was then perceived as a link between the communities and the
research scientists. With the increased understanding of the ob-
jectives and outcomes of the research, there was also a shift to-
wards increased trust in the government as an engaged member of
the partnership.2.3. Regulatory approvals
The decision to conduct a Phase II/III clinical trial to investigate
the safety and efﬁcacy of two promising vaccine candidates was
based on recommendations from a World Health Organization
(WHO) panel of experts to accelerate testing of vaccines and
treatments that had shown promise in animal studies [16].
The partnership had to ensure that the study would be scien-
tiﬁcally, ethically, and clinically appropriate and that it would
adhere to globally accepted standards for protecting the rights and
safety of human clinical research participants. The clinical trial
protocol was submitted to the Liberia Medicines and Health Prod-
ucts Regulatory Authority (LMHRA) and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) at the U.S. National Institutes of
Health (NIH), and the Liberian National Research Ethics Board
(NREB) for required regulatory and ethics approvals. Under opti-
mized settings, obtaining such approvals from multiple agencies is
an arduous, time-consuming process that involves a series of re-
view and edit cycles e an effort that typically takes several months.
Despite the public health emergency, these processes were still
required before a clinical trial of experimental vaccines could be
initiated in Liberia. However, several months was a luxury that no
one could afford in light of the rapidly escalating EVD epidemic. In
several months, the outbreak could potentially be over, with
thousands more infected or dead before the trial could even begin.
In addition to the requirements for regulatory approval, there
was an additional requirement in Liberia for political approval from
the President of Liberia. This approval was being challenged by a
group of Liberian politicians, lawyers, human rights activists, ethi-
cists, journalists, and academicians who were opposed to the
concept of conducting clinical research with inadequate healthcare
facilities, in a research-naïve population, and during an ongoing
public health crisis. There were concerns that potential study par-
ticipants with a low literacy rate would not get a full understanding
of the scientiﬁc objectives of the research and would not be able to
adequately provide informed consent. The fact that the vaccines
had not been sufﬁciently tested in humans supported the argument
that Liberians are humans e not animals e and therefore should
not be used in the research. Some also questioned the ethics of
administering unapproved or unlicensed vaccines and giving false
hope to people who were at risk of exposure to a deadly disease,
and there was the sentiment that participants should not receive
ﬁnancial compensation to take the trial vaccine. Another strong
objection addressed the contribution of Liberians to the eventually
lucrative commercialization of one or more vaccines without the
accrual of any ﬁnancial beneﬁt to the participants or the host
country.
The PREVAIL researchers were quite aware that concerns about
the ethics of conducting clinical trials in West Africa were not
without merit, largely because of past experiences that had major
implications on the conduct of pharmaceutical clinical research in
West Africa (e.g., the Pﬁzer Trovan trial in which 11 Nigerian chil-
dren died during an epidemic of meningococcal meningitis [17]).
However, the concerns raised by Liberians pointed more to the
infamous Tuskegee Experiment of untreated syphilis in Black men
[18]. The PREVAIL leadership and members of the SMC team fully
recognized the importance of adequately addressing this speciﬁc
sensitive concern. This led to the careful crafting of simple and
comprehensible messages around the principles and ethics of
clinical research that were used in stakeholder and community
consultations. The messages, once approved by ethics boards in
both countries, were also used in information sessions for the
clinical study volunteers. Extensive attention was paid to address-
ing the numerous questions and concerns about the informed
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vaccine that had limited testing in humans, and the danger of
possibly being infected with Ebola because the vaccine was re-
ported to contain a “harmless piece of the Ebola virus” as worded in
the study informed consent document. Failure to provide clear and
accurate responses to these questions had the potential to destroy
any trust in PREVAIL and derail the research and response effort.
A series of meetings was spearheaded by the Ofﬁce of the Vice
President of Liberia to ensure that all concerns expressed were
sufﬁciently addressed before a recommendation for political
approval to conduct the vaccine clinical trial could be made to the
President. The outcomes of these meetings prompted further dis-
cussions with key stakeholders representing the Liberian and U.S.
governments. One important result of such discussions was the
provision that post-trial access to the vaccines and treatments, if
proven effective and licensed, would be made available to all
research participants involved in these clinical research trials.
In parallel, international requirements pertaining to cre-
dentialing and import/export procedures, as well as logistical de-
tails such as laboratory testing and pharmacy facilities,
identiﬁcation of equipment, shipping, storage, and meeting spaces
had to be addressed, andwere resolved quickly with the availability
of the high-level support of both the Liberian and U.S. governments
through their respective representatives in the partnership. In less
than 30 days, all requirements were satisﬁed, and approvals were
received for the planned Ebola vaccine clinical trial to proceed.
2.4. Ethics considerations
2.4.1. Clinical trial design
There were conﬂicting ethical views on what types of clinical
research trials would be appropriate to implement in an ongoing
Ebola outbreak. Of the clinical trial designs that were discussed,
two options were given the greatest consideration: ring or cluster
vaccination and randomized placebo control. In the ring vaccina-
tion design, individuals who are at increased risk of infection and
developing the disease within a few weeks are recruited based on
their social or geographical connection to an active case, and
designated as a ‘cluster’. This ring design would allow for open-
label administration of investigational product to all residents of
a speciﬁc cluster, and the participants would be randomized to
either immediate or delayed vaccination [19,20]. On the other hand,
the randomized placebo-controlled trial design would assign
participant exposure to a potentially effective product by chance,
with the possibility that a percentage of the study participants e
the placebo group - would not receive any investigational vaccine.
After much consideration and deliberation, the partnership
considered that a randomized placebo-controlled clinical trial
design would have the greatest likelihood of providing more
deﬁnitive results, and could potentially lead to rapid licensure and
availability of effective vaccines [21].
The PREVAIL vaccine clinical trial was initially designed to enroll
28000 healthy adults living in Liberia, with priority being given to
healthcare workers; laboratory personnel; and ambulance, burial
and surveillance team members. Children, pregnant women and
lactating mothers were excluded from enrolling because of insuf-
ﬁcient safety data on these categories of people. A sub-group of 600
participants would undergo additional assessment to provide more
information on the safety and immunogenic response of the
experimental vaccines.
With the greatly welcomed waning of the EVD infection rate in
Liberia by March 2015, the regulatory agencies and ethics review
boards of both countries agreed that the study should not continue
with the plan of enrolling 28000 participants. A ﬁnal enrollment
target of 1500 was supported by the independent Data SafetyMonitoring Board (DSMB), which consisted of physicians, scientists
and statisticians from both Liberia and the U.S. This group contin-
uously monitored the trial data to ensure the safety of the trial
participants.
2.5. Capacity building and knowledge transfer
Minister Gwenigale’s request for assistance also identiﬁed the
need to strengthen the Liberian healthcare system. In every func-
tional area and aspect of this partnership, the methods chosen to
conduct EVD clinical research were those that also would
contribute to building and sustaining healthcare capacity in Liberia.
Liberians with expertise in healthcare and clinical research were
recruited into the partnership. This helped to establish trust with
potential participants, as well as to employ thosewho had lost their
jobs due to the closure of medical facilities and programs during the
Ebola outbreak. Over 340 Liberians were hired, including doctors,
nurses, physician assistants, pharmacists, laboratory technicians,
and psychosocial counselors. The partnership also was responsible
for employing medical janitorial staff, security guards, and various
administrative, logistics, and operations staff.
Clinical research capacity building involving knowledge transfer
to the Liberians responsible for the day-to-day operations was
essential prior to the beginning of the trial. The goal of PREVAIL is to
prepare Liberians to independently operate the full scope of the
clinical trial. Achieving this goal would result in long-term sus-
tainable beneﬁts for the partners, Liberia, and strategic global
health initiatives. According to the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, “A unique feature of international collaborative
research is the degree to which economically more prosperous
countries can enhance and encourage further collaboration by
leaving the host community or country better off as a result [22].”
Didactic education and hands-on training for clinical staff were
provided by competent professionals from the Liberian Ministry of
Health, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
and the NIH, who provided training on the use of Personal Pro-
tective Equipment (PPE), Good Clinical Practices, Informed Consent,
and policies and procedures related toworking in the vaccine clinic.
Knowledge deﬁcits were promptly addressed with additional
training sessions or refresher training.
Capacity-building commitments are also reﬂected in the de-
cisions to improve the existing infrastructure. While the vaccine
trial might have been easily conducted from the U.S. Embassy, or in
makeshift army tents, the team opted for a more sustainable site
that could be used for future trials. The partnership identiﬁed and
negotiated the use of a section of Redemption Hospital, a
government-run hospital located in one of themost severely Ebola-
affected areas of Monrovia, inwhich to conduct the trial. During the
height of the outbreak, Redemption Hospital was used as a holding
center for Ebola patients, and lost a good number of its staff to EVD.
The Redemption facilities had been neglected over time and had no
laboratory to conduct certain tests needed for the trial. Within 17
days, the building was renovated to a functional clinical trial site e
complete with a fully operational state-of-the-art medical lab. This
site was easily accessible to many of the targeted study participants
who resided in and around the vicinity of the hospital.
3. Overall outcomes
It took a record 12 weeks to bring a Phase II/III, randomized,
controlled, EVD vaccine clinical trial from concept to enrollment in
Liberia e a low-income country in the midst of a national state of
emergency due to EVD, and fraught with infrastructure, ﬁnancial,
political, and healthcare challenges. This was accomplished
through the concerted and rapid efforts of a partnership between
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overwhelming odds. Key elements of PREVAIL’s success included
the establishment of a strong organization in which all members
were treated and respected equally, careful selection and execution
of plans that would build and sustain relevant capacity in the host
country, and active involvement and buy-in at the community
level.
The partnership demonstrated the impact of bi-directional
knowledge transfer. While much of the technical knowledge
transfer was from U.S. to Liberian staff, the Liberians were not al-
ways on the receiving end of the learning experience. Liberian staff
educated their American counterparts on essential aspects of
operating within the Liberian setting and cultural context. Amer-
ican colleagues learned how to improvise when certain resources
such as water or electricity were temporarily lacking or absent;
they learned that religion and family were essential components of
one’s professional life; and they learned that, in Liberia, family was
not necessarily deﬁned by a commonality in bloodline and heritage,
but by a commonality in spirit and purpose.
The PREVAIL vaccine trial exceeded its initial recruitment target
of enrolling 600 participants in 4 months. Within 3 months of
vaccinating the ﬁrst trial participant, 1500 volunteers had enrolled
in the ﬁrst vaccine clinical trial for EVD to be conducted in Liberia.
The clinical research site established at Redemption Hospital now
boasts one of the best medical laboratories in Liberia, with state-of-
the-art equipment that will remain in the country for use by its
citizens long after the clinical trial has ended. Liberian laboratory
technologists have been trained and are now self-sufﬁcient in
operating the equipment.
Evidence of the capacity of the Redemption site and perfor-
mance of the vaccine trial clinical site staff has been objectively
observed by the DSMB. They have commended the trial team for
the rapid enrollment, outstanding data quality, and exceptional
participant retention and follow-up rate of over 98%.
PREVAIL has also launched an EVD treatment trial entitled, A
Multicenter Randomized Safety and Efﬁcacy Study of Putative Inves-
tigational Therapeutics in the Treatment of Patients with Known Ebola
Infection, which has enrolled 72 participants at 11 sites in the U.S.,
Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.
Additionally, PREVAIL launched a third clinical trial to evaluate
the natural history and clinical sequelae of EVD in Ebola survivors
and their close contacts over a 5-year follow-up period. Between 17
June and 3 December 2015, this trial had enrolled 1005 of Liberia’s
documented 1546 Ebola survivors, and 530 of their close contacts,
at 3 newly renovated clinical sites that can be used for future
clinical research projects.
4. Conclusions
The value and tenacity of the human spirit is often under-
estimated, especially in the scientiﬁc arena in which data and facts
dominate. PREVAIL illustrates the power of the human spirit: the
persistent and unfailing desire to succeed. This partnership was
able to accomplish the difﬁcult task of establishing a distinctive
EVD clinical research program in Liberia amidst signiﬁcant logis-
tical adversity and impractical timelines. While much was accom-
plished because of the ﬁnancial and human resources that were
made available for the program, success could not have been ach-
ieved without the effective strategies that represented a unique
mix of American and Liberian ideas and expertise; the common
passion, vision, integrity, trust, and committed relationships of the
team members that formed the partnership; and the courage and
tenacity required to prevail in the most difﬁcult circumstances.
Clinical research on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases
in the developing world presents enormous challenges; and theexperience of the Liberia-U.S. Joint Clinical Research Partnership
presents a classic example. Minister Gwenigale wrote in his request
to Secretary Burwell, “The fruits of research must be relevant in the
societies and population where the problems on which research is
conducted are the gravest.” It is hoped that the fruits of the research
conducted by PREVAIL will extend beyond the clinical trial results
that may inform and strengthen healthcare in Liberia, West Africa,
and throughout the world. The accomplishments of the Liberia-U.S.
Joint Clinical Research Partnership have demonstrated that the
unimaginable can be achieved in the midst of dedication, persis-
tence, and hard work. More in-depth reviews of the challenges and
success factors in each of the functional areas of this partnership
are necessary to build upon this experience and to be better
equipped to mount a clinical research response in the event of a
future infectious disease outbreak. The authors foresee that the
path chosen to launch the PREVAIL clinical research program can
serve as an effective model to build capacity and conduct quality
clinical research in resource-poor settings.
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